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Bilateral Protection and Other Determinants of Trade:  
A Gravity Model Approach 
 





Border protection is thought to be a major impediment to trade, especially in agriculture.  
There are also many other forces shaping the global network of partner trade.  This study 
uses the generalized gravity framework to distinguish among the different drivers of trade.  
The analysis focuses on dyadic determinants that either resist or aid partner trade in total 
merchandise and in selected agricultural markets.  The global dataset used consists of 
bilateral trade among 70 countries in 1986, 1996, 2000, and 2004.  Collectively, the 70 
countries account for 85 percent of the world’s cross-border trade in agriculture and 96 
percent of its GDP.  Empirical results lend support to the Heckscher-Ohlin explanation of 
trade, namely that relative factor endowments motivate cross-border trade.  The results also 
show that tariff protection has not had an appreciable effect on either total merchandise or 
aggregate agricultural trade.  However, trade in specific agricultural goods, such as meat 
and rice, was found to be severely constrained by the presence of bilateral tariffs.    
  3 
Introduction 
 
The WTO Doha Round was launched in 2001 with the aim of cutting tariffs, freeing up 
trade in industrial goods, and opening service markets.  Initially, talks were scheduled to be 
completed by January 1, 2005.  They remain, however, stalled after almost seven years of 
negotiations.   
 
Presently, the prospects for a satisfactory resolution to the Doha Round are uncertain.  The 
gap between the opposing WTO negotiators is wide, though members have recently 
acknowledged the need for greater flexibility on everyone’s part if an agreement is to be 
achieved.  The United States has been resistant to make concessions in the Doha 
negotiations, given insufficient offers of increased market access by its trading partners.. 
 The Europeans have expressed some willingness to lower their agricultural tariffs.  But 
they would like to spare many “sensitive” products, such as beef and poultry.  Japan wants 
to continue excluding rice from competitive world market forces.  Many developing 
countries desire greater access to foreign markets, but they are also interested in protecting 
their sensitive products.  India, for example, has designated most of its major agricultural 
crops (i.e., grains oilseeds, fruit, dairy) as special products that will not be liberalized.   
 
Belief in the benefits of more open markets, has led many countries to purse bilateral free-
trade pacts as an alternative and/or complement to a new multilateral trade agreement.    
Since 2004, the United States completed agreements with Australia, Morocco, and Central 
America (including the Dominican Republic). More recently, agreements were negotiated 
with Panama, Peru, and South Korea. 
 
This study uses the generalized gravity framework to gain a better understanding of the 
forces driving bilateral trade, including that of bilateral protection.  The gravity model 
isolates the impact of any signal driver of trade by controlling for the influences of all other 
determinants.   
  4 
The applied analysis focuses on trade for total merchandise, total agriculture, land-based 
commodities, processed foods, and specific product markets (namely, wheat, rice, red 
meat, and beer).  It uses a dataset consisting of 70 countries trading with each other in four 
time periods, 1986, 1996, 2000, and 2004. 
  
 
Evolving trade patterns 
 
In the past decade global trade for all goods has grown faster than world GDP, increasing 
from 17 percent of world GDP to 23 percent in 2005.   Agricultural continues to decline as 
a share of total trade.  However, agricultural commodity and product trade has also grown 
substantially, increasing more than 50 percent since 2001.  Trade growth is taking place at 
very different rates among trading partners and among the various agricultural goods. 
World fruit and vegetable trade has, for example, outpaced trade in traditional commodities 
such as cereals and livestock products (figure 1).  Moreover, agricultural trade growth 
among NAFTA and the EU regions continues to outstrip world agricultural trade (figure 
2).   
 
Interestingly, the growth in total merchandise and agricultural trade has occurred despite 
the lack of progress negotiating lower tariffs.  Agricultural trade between Canada and the 
United States became considerably larger in the past few years than what could have been 
predicted based upon tariff removal.  The increase in regionalized agricultural trade is also 
surprising in view of the fact that the major free trade agreements were enacted decades 
earlier.  Given the recent expansion of partner trade, the extent to which trade policies 
constrain trade is unclear.  
 
Variations in ad-valorem tariffs 
 
The lack of uniformity in tariffs across countries and commodities (table 1) and the 
multitude of factors driving agricultural trade complicate analysis of the impact that trade  5 
policy exerts.  Supply and demand forces, such as relative costs of production, consumer 
income, and differential tastes and preferences costs operate throughout domestic and 
foreign markets and influence the direction, composition, and volume of trade.  In addition 
to these fundamental market forces, both impediments and inducements, such as economic 
geography and the institutional environment help shape the global network of trade.  The 
extent to which the various factors affect partner trade varies with time and over the 
spectrum of product trade.  In this study, the generalized gravity framework is used to 
identify the drivers of trade and to isolate their impacts.    
 
The study focuses on trade in the overall merchandise market, the aggregate agricultural 
market and two agricultural subsectors which comprise all farm-level commodities and all 
processed food and beverages.  In addition, specific commodity/product markets are 
examined.  Contrasts and comparisons are drawn that show the sensitivity of trade in the 
different markets to the factors that determine who-trades-what-with-whom. 
 
 
The generalized gravity framework 
 
The basic gravity equation, though the workhorse of empirical analysis of many years, 
lacks a theoretical foundation.  Anderson (1979) was the first to draw linkages to economic 
theory.  The generalized framework he developed incorporates the Armington assumption 
that goods produced by different countries are inherently imperfect substitutes by virtue of 
their provenance.  This framework also assumes complete specialization in production and 
identical, homothetic preferences across regions approximated by a CES (constant-
elasticity-of-substitution) utility function.  
 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003, 2004) enhanced the generalized gravity framework by 
incorporating an economic structure that addresses equilibrium of expenditures and 
production within and among trading countries.  They assume that prices differ between 
regions due to trade costs—costs that are unobservable, but which can be inferred from  6 
instrumental variables. Anderson and van Wincoop (AvW) manipulate the CES 
expenditure system and derive an operational model that links trade costs to both bilateral 
and multilateral barriers.  Market-clearing conditions are imposed to solve for general-
equilibrium prices, prices that embody partner resistances confronting both the exporter 
and the importer with all of their trading partners.  The partner-based prices are 
summarized in terms of multilateral trade resistances.   
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where Xij is value of exports from i to j; Yi, Yj, and Yw are the outputs of country i, j, and 
the world (w), respectively; σ is the elasticity of substitution between the countries’ goods; 
Tij denotes bilateral trade costs; Pi capture “outward multilateral resistances” that depend 
on all bilateral resistances for origin i; Pj embodies “inward multilateral resistances” for 
destination j; and the θ’s denote income shares.   
 
The framework in (1-3) informs us that bilateral trade, after controlling for country size, is 
determined by what is often described as “trade barriers,” but which includes inducements 
as well as impediments.  The main insight from (1-3) is that partner trade depends not just  7 
on bilateral “trade barriers” (ie, drivers), but also on multilateral resistances.  A negative 
relationship exists between the bilateral barrier and partner trade, but a positive 
relationship exists between multilateral barriers and partner trade.    
 
The gravity equation that emerges from (1-3) is consistent with economic theory: 
 







m j i ij P P Z y y x ε σ σ β + − − − − + + = ∑
=
 
    
where lower-case variables (i.e., x  and y) refer to logarithms, εij to the disturbance term 
(reflecting measurement error), 
m
ij Z to the vector of m proxies denoting observable 
impediments and inducements to trade, normalized such that  1 =
m
ij Z denotes zero 
influence.   
 
Equation (4) is derived from a general equilibrium view of world trade based upon utility- 
and profit-maximizing behavior.  Generalization permits relaxation of certain assumptions 
underlying the basic model, such as perfect arbitrage.  One advantage of the modern 
gravity model is that it mitigates omitted-variable bias, a problem that plagues atheoretical 
gravity equations.  The problem of omitted-variable bias arises in traditional gravity 
analyses because the multilateral resistances--which are not included as independent 
variables but which are embedded in the error term--are correlated with the bilateral trade 
barriers contained in the estimating equation. 
  
 
Statistical model specification  
 
The statistical model is estimated using ordinary least squares.  Model specification, with 
country fixed effects suppressed for notational simplicity, is as follows:   
  8 
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where subscripts s refers to either a sector, subsector, or individual commodity/product, i 
to the exporting country, and j to the importing country.  Xijs is the value of the bilateral 
trade flow between i and j for s.
1  Yi is exporter’s GDP, denoting the size of the supplying 
market. Yj is importer’s GDP, signifying the size of the demanding market.  Dij measures 
the distance between the two trading partners, a proxy for transportation costs. DYij is the 
absolute difference in per-capita income between trading partners.  DTij quantifies 
exporter-to-importer land/labor ratios. EMij is an indicator of exchange-rate misalignment. 
BPijs measures border protection (expressed in terms of 1 plus ad-valorem tariff 
equivalents), that confront exporter i in j’s market for s.  BPijs captures all forms of applied 
interventions including specific, variable, and compound tariffs; tariff-rate quotas; as well 
as partner special preferences embodied in free trade agreements.
2   
 
Other observable determinants impeding or inducing bilateral trade include 1) common 
borders (CBij), a dummy variable which equals 1 when i and j share a contiguous border 
and 0 otherwise; 2) language similarity (LSij), a dummy variable which equals 1 whenever 
nine percent or more of the population in both countries share a common language and 0 
otherwise;
3 3) colonial heritage (CHij), a dummy variable which equals 1 if two countries 
have established colonial ties since 1945 and 0 otherwise.  αi and γj are exporter and 
importer fixed effects.  
 
                                                 
1 We follow common practice and drop observations when i does not trade with j.  This convention, which 
may lead to biased coefficients, circumvents the problem that the log of zero is not defined.  In future 
analysis, we intend to employ a balanced trade matrix, one which will include zero trade observations. 
2 BPijs is calculated using applied, rather than bound tariffs rates.  Applied rates are the actual tariff rates 
charged at the border by an importing country.  Bounds rates are tariffs resulting from WTO negotiations or 
accessions that are incorporated as part of a country’s schedule of concessions. 
3 The 9 percent threshold serves to denote the level at which the ability to communicate is viewed as not 
imposing burdensome transaction costs.   9 
The incorporation of the exporter dummy (αi) and the importer dummy (γj) account for 
outward and inward multilateral prices, terms that Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) have 
shown to be central to specifications of gravity models that are consistent with theory.   
These fixed effects minimize statistical bias attributable to unobservable trade barriers 
affecting bilateral trade.   
 
 
Capturing elusive economic concepts 
 
The Linder effect 
 
The DYij variable is designed to capture the Linder effect.  Linder (1961) observed that 
suppliers of differentiated products produce primarily to satisfy the tastes of domestic 
consumers.  This practice leads to trade among countries whose consumers have similar 
tastes.  The null hypothesis that has been used to empirically test whether tastes and 
preferences affect the distribution of trade is that bilateral trade is a negative function of 
the absolute difference in per capita incomes in the two regions (Thursby and Thursby, 
1987; Bergstrand, 1990). 
 
Government border policies 
 
Accurate quantification of tariffs, non-tariff barriers, trade preferences embodied in free 
trade agreements, and other border policies potentially affecting partner trade presents 
many challenges, especially given the variety and complexity of available policy 
instruments and their (uneven) use distribution.  Protection and special preferences are best 
measured using ad-valorem subsidy and tariffs equivalents (AVEs), calculated at the 
specific commodity/importer level. AVEs enable analysts to compare the level of 
government policies across country/commodity markets.   
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The development of comprehensive measures of bilateral protection/preferences that cover 
the many products traded among the many trading partners in the world presents many 
challenges. For example, transforming partner-specific non-ad-valorem measures, such as 
compound tariffs, tariff-rate quotas, and preferential trading agreements, into AVEs is a 
non-trivial task. Moreover, there is the challenge of how best to summarize 
protection/preferences at sector/subsector and/or regional levels.  Ideally, aggregate 
measures are derived from detailed product/country AVEs.  However, even when detailed 
data are available, there remains the challenge of how best to develop aggregate measures 
of protection/preferences that are representative.  .   
 
The common practice is to use import-weighted averages to gauge protection at aggregate 
levels.  This approach suffers from endogeneity bias because of the inverse relationship 
between import flows and tariffs, (eg., the higher the tariff, the lower the flow).  Leamer 
(1974) used world imports as a weighting scheme to circumvent endogeneity.  Leamer’s 
approach does not, however, account for the importer’s specific trade profile.  Bouët et al. 
(2005) developed a weighting scheme designed to address both the problem of 
endogeneity and the need to consider aspects of importer specificity.  Use can also be made 
of partner-specific commodity compositional export shares to weight border-policy metrics 
in each market. The use of partner-product weights has the advantage of characterizing the 
importance of actual bilateral trade profiles.   
 
In this study, the MAcMap database
4 is the primary source from which we obtain measures 
of protection/preferences.  This database contains consistent and exhaustive measures of 
government border policies among 163 reporting countries trading 5,111 products with 
208 partners in 2001.  The creators of MAcMap have developed a sophisticated 
methodology that addresses many of the complexities measuring partner 
protection/preferences (Bouët et al.).  The methodology addresses endogeneity and 
aggregation bias that afflict conventional approaches.  It also identifies ways to harmonize 
                                                 
4 Note, the measures of applied protection used in the GTAP framework are derived from the MAcMap 
database.  11 
different types of tariffs, including ad-valorem, specific, mixed, mega, and tariff-rate 
quotas (TRQ).




Finally, we use a measure of exchange-rate misalignment (EMij) to determine how 
financial linkages among countries affect food trade.  According to economic theory, 
domestic prices of foreign currencies are neutral.  Consequently, exchange rates are not 
expected to affect domestic or foreign decisions affecting supply and demand.  But, 
policymakers express concern from time-to-time about over- and under-valued exchange 
rates.  Witness, for example, the current public debate about the appropriate foreign-
currency value of the Chinese renminbi.  Moreover, the economic literature is replete with 
empirical evidence showing that market-determined exchange rates are often out of 
equilibrium.  Dornbusch (1976) and Bergsten and Williamson (2003) show that prolonged 
departures of actual exchange rates from purchasing power parity are not uncommon 
phenomena, even for the developed countries having flexible exchange rates.  
 
To test whether EMij adversely affects food trade, we modify Perée and Steinherr’s (1989) 
indicator of “exchange-rate uncertainty” (EUij) which captures both current and 
accumulated experience:     
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where max (min) k -  t ij, Z is the maximum (minimum) value of the absolute value of the 
exchange rate index over time interval of size k. past period.  The central notion underlying 
                                                 
5 Systemized rules were used to convert mixed and compound tariffs into representative measures of 
protection.  To account for TRQs, applied tariff rates were calculated that reflect marginal levels of 
protection from tariff fill-rates and the imposition of set of procedures. Filters were applied to render 
prohibitive or “mega” tariffs that exceed the lowest rate that would drive imports to zero.  12 
1
t V is that traders’ uncertainty is conditioned by their memory of the high and low exchange 
rate over some relevant period, which we chose to be 10 years (the range that both Cho et 
al. and Perée and Steinherr also selected). 
2
t V adds more recent information.  It puts the 
contemporaneous exchange rate into historical perspective.  To calculate this second 
component, we follow the practice adopted by Rosenberg (2003) and take the mean of real 
exchange rates over a 30-year period (1975-2004) as the proxy measure for the purchasing-
power equilibrium rate.   
 
EMij differs from EUij in that the former is calculated using real (2000) exchange rates, 
while the latter is derived from nominal rates.  Both are indicators that embody notions of 




We have assembled a cross-sectional data set for 70 countries for 1986, 1996, 2000, and 
2004.
6  This data set includes all countries for which we could obtain reliable 
macroeconomic data on exchange rates and years for which both governance indicators 
and information about bilateral trade flows were available.  The 70 countries accounted for 
85 percent of the world’s cross-border trade in agriculture and 96 percent of global GDP 
and in 2002.   
 
Data sources: 
•  The data on bilateral trade were derived from UN Comtrade compiled at the United 
Nations by UN Statistical Office.  We used WTO’s definition of agriculture to base 
                                                 
6 The 70 countries include Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium-Luxembourg, Brazil, 
Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China (mainland), Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, 
El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Saudi 
Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, South African Customs Union (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and 
Swaziland), South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad-Tobago, 
Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  13 
our calculation of total agricultural trade.  Agricultural subsector and commodity 
definitions are based on product classifications developed at the Economic 
Research Service, USDA.   
•  Distance between capital cities and/or the major commercial center closest between 
partner countries were calculated using the great circle method obtained from the 
Agricultural Research Service of USDA.   
•  Measures of border policies were derived from the MAcMap database and 
knowledge of the existence of free-trade agreements. 
•  The data on bilateral exchange rates, derived from information secured from 
International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund and Financial 
Statistics of the Federal Reserve Board, came from the Economic Research Service, 
USDA.    
•  Information about arable land came from the United Nations, Food and 
Agricultural Organization’s FAOSTAT.  
•  Data about colonial heritage and language similarity were obtained from Andrew 
Rose’s website. 





Primary supply and demand determinants 
 
Relative factor endowments 
 
Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) theory leads one to expect that agricultural trade would be 
positively related to the exporter-to-importer land/labor ratio because the production of 
agricultural goods requires relative intensive use of land.  The theory also indicates that 
merchandise trade may be negatively related to the relative land/labor ratio factor 
endowments as most goods use more labor than land in production.  Our empirical results-- 14 
with negative coefficients for total merchandise trade and positive coefficients for 
agricultural trade (whether the latter includes the entire sector, the land-based or processed 
food subsectors, or the individual agricultural product/commodities (i.e., wheat, rice, red 
meat, and beer)—lend support to the H-O explanation of trade (tables 2-9).
7   
 
At first blush, a simplified extension of H-O logic to trade in the processed-food subsector 
(as well as for beer) led us to hypothesis a negative relationship between trade and the 
exporter-to-importer land/labor ratio.  We noted that the production of processed food 
products likely uses labor more intensively than land, favoring exporters who possess a 
greater supply of labor than land in comparison with their trading partners. Interestingly, 
the empirical results revealed a positive, not negative, relationship between trade in 
processed foods and DTij.  This finding led us to a more sophisticated interpretation of the 
empirical results, one that focused on the derived demand for land in the case of processed 
food: 
 
We recalled that primary commodities, such as grains, oilseeds, and other basic staples, are 
essential inputs in the production of processed foods; and reasoned that as these 
commodity inputs are used intensively in manufacturing food, they may be viewed as 
embodying the land resource base. Given this view, our empirical results suggest that the 
derived demand for land relative to the availability of the labor supply in exporter and 




Both positive and negative parameter estimates were generated for DYij --the variable 
denoting the absolute difference in per-capita incomes between trading partners.  The 
                                                 
7 Interestingly, the elasticities of DTij with respect to wheat and red meat are considerably larger than either 
the corresponding elasticities for aggregate agriculture or the two agricultural subsectors.  These results show 
that the agricultural sector and the two agricultural subsectors contain products that are not as dependent on 
the relative availability of land as are wheat and red meat. 
  15 
negative coefficients generated for processed foods, and also for beer, support the Linder 
hypothesis.  These results show that two countries with similar tastes and preferences 
(proxied by comparable per-capita income), trade more with each other in differentiated 
products than with partners having dissimilar types of demand.   
 
Positive DYij parameters demonstrate that as the value of DYij widens—that is to say, the 
per-capita income between two countries diverge—trade increases.   Divergence in per 
capita income between trading partners is a proxy for partner disparity in their levels of 
development and differences in comparative advantage.  Model results show that income 
dissimilarity increases partner trade in total merchandise and agricultural trade, a not 
unexpected finding given differences in production specialization patterns among countries 
within these aggregate sectors.   
 
 




Transportation costs, proxied by physical distance, generally deter trade in total 
merchandise more than in total agriculture.  Trade in processed foods, however, is 
constrained more by transportation costs than is total merchandise trade.  The 1986-1996-
2000-2004 average Dij elasticity with respect to merchandise trade is -1.23, while the 
corresponding average elasticity for processed foods is -1.45.  The average Dij elasticity for 
wheat, rice, and meat over the same 4-year period is higher, equaling -1.00.   
 
The distance elasticities with respect to trade of the basic commodities are less sensitive 
than is the corresponding elasticities of manufactured goods and processed foods.    This 
finding provides support to the proposition that foreign manufacturers face greater 
competition from domestic sources of supply in the importing countries than do exporters 
of primary agricultural commodities.  Given the substitutability between locally-produced  16 
and foreign supply sources for the raw agricultural ingredients used to manufacture 
processed foods, it is understandable why trade in these goods is more sensitive to 
transportation costs than are the primary agricultural commodities where the location of 
production is dependent upon the world-wide distribution of land.  
 
In all the markets analyzed, transportation costs increased with time despite advances in 
technology.  For example, the four individual agricultural commodity/product average fell 
steadily, decreasing from -0.78 in 1986 to -1.15 in 2004. Rising transportation costs are, no 




The empirical results show no discernable impact whatsoever of common borders on 
merchandise trade in 1986, 1996, 2000, and 2004.  In addition, CBij estimates were 
generally not significantly different from zero for processed agricultural products--foods 
that are more easily transported across long distances than unprocessed agricultural goods. 
Physical adjacency does, however, impart trade advantages in land-based agriculture and 
among the individual agricultural commodities examined.    
 
To derive ad-valorem subsidy equivalents (ASE) for geographical contiguity from gravity-
model parameters, it is necessary to make assumptions about the elasticity of substitution 
(σ).  The elasticity of substitution is most assuredly smaller for aggregate sectors than for 
an individual commodity/product.  Assuming that the σ for land-based agriculture is 5, 
ASE for sharing a common national border averages 7 percent (table 10).  Assuming that 
the σ for an individual commodity/product is 10, geographic contiguity conveys trade 
advantages for countries sharing a common border that averages 14 percent for wheat, 13 
percent for beer, 12 percent for red meat, and 5 percent for rice.  
 
Cultural linkages 
  17 
Cultural similarities/dissimilarities denote non-physical distance.  Cultural ties lower the 
non-physical distance between two countries.  In this study, cultural linkages are proxied 
by two variables, namely the ability of a significant proportion of the population in both 
countries to communicate in the same language and possession of a common colonial 
heritage.   
 
Having the capability to converse in the same language facilitates communication and, 
therefore, is believed to foster commercial exchange.  Indeed, the empirical results provide 
confirmation that language similarity bestows a trade advantage.  Assuming that the σ for 
the aggregate sectors is 5, the ad-valorem subsidy equivalent for language provides a 
competitive advantage that averages 17 percent for total merchandise trade and between 18 
and 19 percent for trade in the two agricultural subsectors. Interestingly, the ability to 
communicate in the same language does not generally have a discernable trade effect in the 
wheat and rice foodgrain markets.  It does, however impart as much as a 6 to 8 percent 
advantage to partner trade in red meats and beer (under the assumption that the σ equals 
10). 
 
Model results show that the sharing of a common colonial heritage has a more pronounced 
impact on trade at the economy-wide and agricultural-sector levels than language 
similarity.  The colonial-heritage ASE for total merchandise trade averages 24 percent for 
total merchandise trade and 32 percent for the agricultural sectors.  These findings suggest 
that the motivation for trade during the colonial era, when the industrializing and the 
developing countries exchanged manufactured items for agricultural goods, established 





Financial sector policies 
  18 
Price distortions attributable to exchange-rate deviations from equilibrium values were 
found to generally lower trade.  For example, when the U.S. dollar was undervalued in 
1996, the exchange-rate-misalignment elasticity with respect to trade was -0.41 for the 
agricultural sector, -0.49 for land-based commodities, and -.62 for processed foods.  





The generalized gravity model for total merchandise shows that the impact of applied 
protection on partner trade, after controlling for the influence of the other determinants, is 
not significantly different from zero.  This finding is not surprising given the GATT/WTO 
liberalization that has lowered worldwide tariffs on most goods.   
 
Government protection remains high in agriculture, in contrast to manufactured goods.  
Yet, model results for aggregate agricultural trade also show no statistically significant 
impacts of border policies.  Given the skewed distribution of protection across the sector, 
with most products being freely traded among countries, this finding is also not surprising.  
Clearly, fundamental supply and demand determinants, such as relative factor 
endowments, transportation costs, and market size, are more important drivers of 
agricultural trade for the sector as a whole than are government border policies. 
 
The impact of restrictive tariffs is best evaluated at the specific commodity/product level.  
In the case of wheat, the BPij elasticities are not significantly different from zero; again, a 
not unexpected finding given that wheat is a freely traded commodity.  BPij parameter 
estimates are, however, consistently negative and statistically significant for rice and red 
meat.  Bilateral protection elasticities with respect to rice trade (derived from mean BPij 
values) range from -0.4 to -0.5.  Corresponding elasticities for red meat fall within the -1.0 
to -1.3 range.   




Economic theory informs us that at the individual country level, border protection raises 
domestic prices that harm local consumers and imposes losses on low-cost exporters that 
forego sales in the foreign market. At the global level, protection causes demand to 
contract and supply to expand, both of which distort price signals and lowers world 
welfare.   
 
Theory also informs us that there are many other socio-economic and political-institutional 
determinants of cross-border trade, including market size, resource endowments, 
geographical proximity, tastes and preferences, cultural ties, and financial linkages.      
This paper used the generalized gravity framework to gauge the influence of the various 
factors driving the direction and volume of trade.   
 
One noteworthy finding is that relative factor endowments matter.  Parameter estimates for 
the exporter land-to-labor ratio relative to the importer land-to-labor were positive and 
statistically significant in all agricultural markets.  By contrast, the relative-factor-
endowment variable was negative and statistically significant for total merchandise trade in 
1986, 1996, 2000, and 2004.   These empirical results lend support to the Heckscher-Ohlin 
theory of comparative advantage.   
 
Another important finding was that border protection was shown not to have had an 
appreciable effect on aggregate agricultural trade.  The analysis established, however, that 
trade in specific agricultural goods has been severely constrained due to the presence of 
bilateral tariff protection.     20 
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Table 1: Agricultural Import Tariffs for Selected Importers (ad valorem rates)     
   Australia  China Japan Philippines India  Zimbabwe  Nigeria  Turkey  USA 
         percent      
Rice   0.0  0.4  796.0  24.7 25.0 0.0  37.4  31.8 5.1 
Wheat 0.0  0.9  183.1  5.0  0.0 0.0 5.0  26.8  0.0 
Coarse grains  0.0  87.7  38.6 28.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  56.6  0.0 
Fruits and vegetables  1.1  24.8  14.0 9.3  40.2 25.0 75.0  37.1 0.6 
Meat 0.0  15.0  46.8  21.3  44.0 8.3 31.3  39.8  1.7 
Beer 9.7  41.4  15.1  5.8  125.9 60.0 120.5  15.9  1.4 
Land-based 
commodities  0.3 27.8  197.7 14.8  33.3 10.3 29.4  35.9 3.6 
Processed food  2.4  17.9  9.5  6.2 40.4  18.8  25.2  13.9  2.5 
Source: MacMaps(2004) ad-valorem equivalent measures             
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Table 2:  Total merchandise trade: Generalized gravity equation coefficients   
        
        
Variables Symbols  1986  1996  2000  2004 
          
Exporter's income  Yi  0.77*** 0.91*** 1.02***  1.02*** 
     (0.05) (0.04) (0.03)  (0.04) 
          
Importer's income  Yj  0.79*** 1.06*** 1.00***  1.03*** 
     (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)  (0.03) 
          
Distance Dij  -1.19*** -1.24*** -1.29***  -1.21*** 
     (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.04) 
           
Income differences  DYij  0.10*** 0.08*** 0.07***  0.08*** 
     (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) 
            
Land/labor differences  DTij  -0.08*** 0.00 -0.08*** -0.07*** 
     (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) 
          
Exchange-rate EMij  -0.53*** -0.02 -0.37***  -0.24*** 
misalignment     (0.08) (0.11) (0.11)  (0.08) 
          
Language similarity  LSij  0.55*** 0.71*** 0.51***  0.69*** 
     (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.07) 
          
Colonial heritage  CHij  0.99*** 0.76*** 0.84***  0.80*** 
     (0.16) (0.15) (0.16)  (0.17) 
             
Common border  CBij  -0.13 -0.06 -0.06  -0.05 
     (0.19) (0.16) (0.16)  (0.16) 
          
Bilateral protection  BPij  0.97 0.55 -0.67  -0.96 
     (0.96) (0.81) (0.78)  (0.79) 
                 
        
Adjusted R
2   0.74 0.80 0.81  0.81 
Root mean square error    1.65 1.45 1.45  1.46 
Number of observations    4200 4495 4651  4665 
                 
        
Parentheses denote t statistics based upon White’s standard errors which are consistent and robust to heteroskedasticity. 
The * denotes the null hypothesis is rejected at the 0.10 significance level, ** at the 0.5 level, and *** at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 3:  Total Agriculture trade: Generalized gravity equation coefficients   
        
        
Variables Symbols  1986  1996  2000  2004 
          
Exporter's income  Yi  0.74*** 0.76*** 0.82***  0.93*** 
     (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.04) 
          
Importer's income  Yj  0.75*** 0.86*** 0.98***  0.92*** 
     (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.03) 
          
Distance Dij  -1.01*** -1.18*** -1.24***  -1.39*** 
     (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.04) 
          
Income differences  DYij  0.19*** 0.13*** 0.15***  0.08*** 
     (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) 
          
Land/labor differences  DTij  0.20*** 0.13*** 0.17***  0.16*** 
     (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) 
          
Exchange-rate EMij  -0.56*** -0.41*** -0.64***  0.01 
misalignment     (0.07) (0.12) (0.13)  (0.10) 
          
Language similarity  LSij  0.61*** 0.66*** 0.74***  0.74*** 
     (0.09) (0.08) (0.08)  (0.08) 
          
Colonial heritage  CHij  1.33*** 1.19*** 1.05***  1.06*** 
     (0.18) (0.17) (0.17)  (0.18) 
          
Common border  CBij  0.48* 0.36 0.41**  0.13 
     (0.21) (0.18) (0.18)  (0.18) 
          
Bilateral protection  BPij  0.03 0.35* 0.28  0.32 
     (0.27) (0.21) (0.23)  (0.23) 
                 
        
Adjusted R
2   0.67 0.71 0.73  0.73 
Root mean square error    1.76 1.64 1.60  1.68 
Number of observations    3509 3951 4117  4192 
                 
        
Parentheses denote t statistics based upon White’s standard errors which are consistent and robust to heteroskedasticity. 
The * denotes the null hypothesis is rejected at the 0.10 significance level, ** at the 0.5 level, and *** at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 4:  Trade in land-based agricultural commodities: Generalized gravity equation 
coefficients 
          
          
Variables Symbols  1986  1996  2000  2004 
            
Exporter's income  Yi  0.89*** 0.78*** 0.75*** 0.85*** 
     (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
         
Importer's income  Yj  0.95*** 0.87*** 0.90*** 0.95*** 
     (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
         
Distance Dij  -0.96*** -1.08*** -1.14*** -1.30*** 
     (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
         
Income differences  DYij  0.16*** 0.15*** 0.15**** 0.08*** 
     (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
         
Land/labor differences  DTij  0.27*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.06*** 
     (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
         
Exchange-rate EMij  0.02 -0.49***  -0.25*  -0.14 
misalignment     (0.08) (0.14) (0.15) (0.11) 
         
Language similarity  LSij  0.56*** 0.58*** 0.71*** 0.73*** 
     (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) 
         
Colonial heritage  CHij  1.16*** 1.08*** 0.90*** 0.93*** 
     (0.21) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) 
         
Common border  CBij  0.61*** 0.55*** 0.51***  0.20 
     (0.21) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) 
         
Bilateral protection  BPij  -0.32 0.01  0.23  0.20 
     (0.21) (0.18) (0.18) (0.20) 
                 
       
Adjusted R
2   0.64 0.68 0.69 0.70 
Root mean square error    1.83 1.76 1.68 1.82 
Number of observations    3399 3843 3965 4073 
                 
          
Parentheses denote t statistics based upon White’s standard errors which are consistent and robust to heteroskedasticity. 
The * denotes the null hypothesis is rejected at the 0.10 significance level, ** at the 0.5 level, and *** at the 0.01 level. 
    27 
 
Table 5:  Trade in processed foods: Generalized gravity equation coefficients   
        
        
Variables Symbols  1986  1996  2000  2004 
          
Exporter's income  Yi  0.32*** 1.05*** 0.82***  0.73*** 
     (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.04) 
          
Importer's income  Yj  0.88*** 0.78*** 0.68***  1.03*** 
     (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)  (0.04) 
          
Distance Dij  -1.24*** -1.33*** -1.54***  -1.67*** 
     (0.06) (0.05) (0.04)  (0.05) 
          
Income differences  DYij  -0.02 -0.05** -0.03  -0.06*** 
     (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)  (0.02) 
          
Land/labor differences  DTij  0.26*** 0.07** 0.08***  0.19*** 
     (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)  (0.02) 
          
Exchange-rate EMij  -0.51*** -0.62***  -0.5***  -0.02 
misalignment     (0.08) (0.16) (0.14)  (0.11) 
             
Language similarity  LSij  0.65*** 0.66*** 0.72***  0.57*** 
     (0.11) (0.10) (0.09)  (0.10) 
          
Colonial heritage  CHij  1.18*** 1.01*** 1.05***  1.43*** 
     (0.23) (0.18) (0.16)  (0.20) 
          
Common border  CBij  0.27 0.40* 0.19  0.15 
     (0.22) (0.21) (0.18)  (0.19) 
          
Bilateral protection  BPij  0.02 0.28 -0.78  -0.41 
     (0.72) (0.58) (0.52)  (0.76) 
                 
        
Adjusted R
2   0.64 0.68 0.72  0.70 
Root mean square error    1.73 1.63 1.56  1.71 
Number of observations    2460 3109 3317  3503 
                 
        
Parentheses denote t statistics based upon White’s standard errors which are consistent and robust to heteroskedasticity. 
The * denotes the null hypothesis is rejected at the 0.10 significance level, ** at the 0.5 level, and *** at the 0.01 level. 
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Table  6: Wheat trade: Generalized gravity equation coefficients    
         
         
Variables Symbols  1986  1996  2000  2004 
           
Exporter's income  Yi  1.15*** 0.82***  0.91***  0.52*** 
     (0.14) (0.12)  (0.13)  (0.12) 
           
Importer's income  Yj  0.35** -0.14  -0.10  0.11 
     (0.17) (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.15) 
           
Distance Dij  -0.56*** -0.83***  -0.88***  -1.12*** 
     (0.22) (0.19)  (0.18)  (0.21) 
           
Income differences  DYij  -0.14 -0.11  -0.19**  -0.08 
     (0.13) (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.10) 
           
Land/labor differences  DTij  0.65*** 0.23***  0.22**  0.44*** 
     (0.16) (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.12) 
           
Exchange-rate EMij  0.85*** 0.35  0.11  0.75 
misalignment     (0.26) (0.49)  (0.45)  (0.48) 
           
Language similarity  LSij  0.55 -0.49  0.48  -0.40 
     (0.37) (0.34)  (0.32)  (0.38) 
           
Colonial heritage  CHij  1.87** 0.52  1.38**  1.98*** 
     (0.86) (0.73)  (0.69)  (0.69) 
           
Common border  CBij  1.00* 1.17***  1.15**  1.35*** 
     (0.56) (0.44)  (0.45)  (0.48) 
           
Bilateral protection  BPij  0.30 -0.21  0.45  0.64 
     (0.88) (0.92)  (0.80)  (0.70) 
                 
         
Adjusted R
2   0.50 0.50  0.43  0.52 
Root mean square error    2.40 2.52  2.66  2.83 
Number of observations    373 515  579  619 
                 
          
Parentheses denote t statistics based upon White’s standard errors which are consistent and robust to heteroskedasticity. 
The * denotes the null hypothesis is rejected at the 0.10 significance level, ** at the 0.5 level, and *** at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 7:  Rice trade: Generalized gravity equation coefficients    
         
         
Variables Symbols  1986  1996  2000  2004 
           
Exporter's income  Yi  0.16** 0.57***  0.56***  0.54*** 
     (0.08) (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.11) 
           
Importer's income  Yj  0.33*** 0.47***  0.37***  0.39*** 
     (0.11) (0.10)  (0.08)  (0.12) 
           
Distance Dij  -0.79*** -1.2***  -1.15***  -1.26*** 
     (0.17) (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.13) 
           
Income differences  DYij  -0.25*** -0.24***  -0.11*  -0.11* 
     (0.07) (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
           
Land/labor differences  DTij  0.30*** 0.30***  0.14**  0.16** 
     (0.08) (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.07) 
           
Exchange-rate EMij  0.24 -0.50  -0.19  -0.26*** 
misalignment     (0.28) (0.36)  (0.40)  (0.32) 
           
Language similarity  LSij  0.00 0.09  0.34  0.26*** 
     (0.29) (0.25)  (0.25)  (0.24) 
           
Colonial heritage  CHij  -0.28 0.26  -0.36  -0.61 
     (0.59) (0.54)  (0.63)    (0.50) 
           
Common border  CBij  0.93** 0.23  0.31  0.73** 
     (0.42) (0.35)  (0.37)    (0.34) 
           
Bilateral protection  BPij  -0.95** -0.72*  -0.70*  -0.71* 
     (0.43)  (0.42)   (0.39)   (0.40) 
                 
         
Adjusted R
2   0.43 0.47  0.39  0.48 
Root mean square error    2.31 2.23  2.32  2.47 
Number of observations    623 863  991  1118 
                 
         
Parentheses denote t statistics based upon White’s standard errors which are consistent and robust to heteroskedasticity. 
The * denotes the null hypothesis is rejected at the 0.10 significance level, ** at the 0.5 level, and *** at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 8:  Red meat trade: Generalized gravity equation coefficients   
        
        
Variables Symbols  1986  1996  2000  2004 
          
Exporter's income  Yi  0.05*** 0.18**  0.12*  0.07 
     (0.07) (0.08) (0.06)  (0.06) 
          
Importer's income  Yj  0.65*** 0.57*** 0.58***  0.5*** 
     (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.07) 
          
Distance Dij  -0.85*** -1.18*** -1.04***  -1.20*** 
     (0.09) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.08) 
          
Income differences  DYij  0.01 0.04*** -0.02  -0.03 
     (0.06) (0.05) (0.04)  (0.04) 
          
Land/labor differences  DTij  0.36*** 0.38*** 0.44***  0.44*** 
     (0.06) (0.05) (0.04)  (0.05) 
          
Exchange-rate EMij  -0.19 -0.20*** 0.27  -0.59*** 
misalignment     (0.21) (0.25) (0.26)  (0.23) 
          
Language similarity  LSij  0.49** 0.71*** 0.66***  0.24 
     (0.20) (0.16) (0.16)  (0.16) 
          
Colonial heritage  CHij  0.84** 0.77**  0.21  0.26 
     (0.34) (0.31) (0.35)  (0.30) 
          
Common border  CBij  1.02*** 1.09*** 1.02***  1.02*** 
     (0.31) (0.26) (0.27)  (0.23) 
          
Bilateral protection  BPij  -2.60*** -2.01*** -2.31***  -2.50*** 
     (0.43) (0.39) (0.41)  (0.46) 
                 
        
Adjusted R
2   0.50 0.59 0.56  0.59 
Root mean square error    2.19 2.06 2.10  2.20 
Number of observations    1429 1692 1748  1804 
                 
        
Parentheses denote t statistics based upon White’s standard errors which are consistent and robust to heteroskedasticity. 
The * denotes the null hypothesis is rejected at the 0.10 significance level, ** at the 0.5 level, and *** at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 9:  Beer trade: Generalized gravity equation coefficients    
         
         
Variables Symbols  1986  1996  2000  2004 
           
Exporter's income  Yi  0.22** 0.53***  0.36***  0.36*** 
     (0.09) (0.11)  (0.07)  (0.07) 
           
Importer's income  Yj  0.86*** 0.76***  0.78***  0.68*** 
     (0.09) (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.06) 
           
Distance Dij  -0.90*** -1.11***  -1.15***  -1.13*** 
     (0.10) (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.08) 
           
Income differences  DYij  -0.19*** -0.10**  0.01  0.06 
     (0.06) (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.05) 
           
Land/labor differences  DTij  0.18*** 0.14***  0.09**  0.01 
     (0.07) (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
           
Exchange-rate EMij  -0.35** 0.15  0.23  -0.81*** 
misalignment     (0.18) (0.24)  (0.26)  (0.21) 
           
Language similarity  LSij  0.20 0.15  0.51***  0.53*** 
     (0.20) (0.16)  (0.15)  (0.16) 
           
Colonial heritage  CHij  -0.48 0.06  0.27  0.56* 
     (0.36) (0.33)  (0.30)  (0.29) 
           
Common border  CBij  1.08*** 1.24***  0.81***  1.28*** 
     (0.34) (0.26)  (0.25)  (0.27) 
           
Bilateral protection  BPij  -1.11 -1.09**  -0.40  -0.23 
     (0.73) (0.45)  (0.41)  (0.48) 
                 
         
Adjusted R
2   0.53 0.58  0.56  0.60 
Root mean square error    1.77 1.77  1.78  1.89 
Number of observations    800 1251  1346  1436 
                 
         
Parentheses denote t statistics based upon White’s standard errors which are consistent and robust to heteroskedasticity. 
The * denotes the null hypothesis is rejected at the 0.10 significance level, ** at the 0.5 level, and *** at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 10: Ad-valorem tariff equivalent effects for language similarities, colonial heritage, and common 
border 
              
    Symbols  1986  1996  2000 2004 1986  1996  2000 2004 
        σ = 5        σ = 10    
                    
Total merchandise  LSij  0.15  0.19  0.14 0.19 0.06  0.08  0.06 0.08 
Total merchandise  CHij  0.28  0.21  0.23 0.22 0.12  0.09  0.10 0.09 
Total merchandise  CBij  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 
                      
Total agriculture  LSij  0.16  0.18  0.20 0.20 0.07  0.08  0.09 0.09 
Total agriculture  CHij  0.39  0.35  0.30 0.30 0.16  0.14  0.12 0.12 
Total agriculture  CBij  0.00  0.00  0.11 0.00 0.05  0.00  0.05 0.00 
                      
Land-based agric.  LSij  0.15  0.16  0.19 0.20 0.06  0.07  0.08 0.08 
Land-based agric.  CHij  0.34  0.31  0.25 0.26 0.14  0.13  0.11 0.11 
Land-based agric.  CBij  0.00  0.15  0.14 0.00 0.07  0.06  0.06 0.00 
                      
Processed foods  LSij  0.18  0.18  0.20 0.15 0.07  0.08  0.08 0.07 
Processed foods  CHij  0.34  0.29  0.30 0.43 0.14  0.12  0.12 0.17 
Processed foods  CBij  0.00  0.11  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.05  0.00 0.00 
                      
Wheat  LSij  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 
Wheat  CHij  0.60  0.00  0.41 0.64 0.23  0.00  0.17 0.25 
Wheat  CBij    0.28 0.34  0.33 0.40 0.12  0.14  0.14 0.16 
                      
Rice  LSij  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.07 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.03 
Rice  CHij  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 
Rice  CBij  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.20 0.11  0.00  0.00 0.08 
                      
Red meat  LSij  0.13  0.19  0.18 0.00 0.06  0.08  0.08 0.00 
Red meat  CHij  0.23  0.21  0.00 0.00 0.10  0.09  0.00 0.00 
Red meat  CBij  0.00  0.31  0.29 0.29 0.12  0.13  0.12 0.12 
                      
Beer  LSij  0.00  0.00  0.14 0.14 0.00  0.00  0.06 0.06 
Beer  CHij  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.15 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.06 
Beer  CBij  0.00  0.36  0.22 0.38 0.13  0.15  0.09 0.15 
σ denotes the elasticity of substitution.           
AVEs were assumed to equal zero when underlying parameter estimates were not statistically significant.      
 
 